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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA GLADYS YATES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER, 
a project of Division of 
Family and Community Medicine, 
University of Utah; UINTAH 
COUNTY HOSPITAL; VERNAL DRUG 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
and GORDON LEE BALKA, M.D., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant, Velma Gladys Yates, brought this 
action to recover damages for personal injuries alleging the 
commission of medical malpractice by defendants-respondents. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen found that appellant 
had failed to comply with the notice requirement of 78-14-8, 
Utah Code Ann., and ordered the appellant's complaint dismissed. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order 
dismissing the complaint and the right to have a trial upon the 
merits of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the period which began in December of 1975 and 
ended in March of 1977, appeilant was a patient of and undergoing 
medical treatment from respondent Dr. Gordon Lee Balka and re-
spondent Vernal Family Health Center. Dr. Balka was, during this 
sixteen month period, employed by the Vernal Family Health Center. 
In the cause of this treatment, appellant was furnished with an 
unwarranted amount of prescriptions and refills (approximately 
217) of no less than fourteen different drugs, by Dr. Balka 
and other members of the staff of the Vernal Family Health 
Center, all of which were dispensed by respondent Vernal Drug 
Company. 
As a direct result of the negligence in providing 
appellant with this enormous quantity of drugs, appellant became 
disoriented and incoherent, which disorientation necessitated 
her hospitalization in respondent Uintah County Hospital on 
March 12, 1977. After approximately three days of hospitaliza-
tion, due to negligent treatment and supervision of respondent 
Uintah County Hospital, appellant began to suffer continual 
convulsive seizures which required her transfer and admission 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to Holy Cross Hospital on March 17, 1977. These seizures were 
eventually controlled and on April 6, 1977 appellant was re-
turned to Uintah County Hospital where she remained until her 
discharge on April 12, 1977. 
Subsequently, upon the stabilization of appellant's 
condition and the administration of tests in March of 1978 it 
was discovered that as a result of the aforementioned abuse of 
drugs and convulsive seizures appellant had suffered permanent 
mental disability. This deterioration of mental capability has 
caused appellant to function at a very marginal level in need 
of continual close supervision to provide for her basic needs. 
On April 7, 1978, pursuant to 78-14-8, Utah Code Ann., 
appellant's husband and attorney executed a notice of intent to 
commence a malpractice action which was in the form of a letter 
and which was served on respondents Vernal Family Health Center, 
Dr. Balka, Vernal Drug Company and Uintah County Hospital on 
April 12, 1978. 
On July 19, 1978, appellant filed the Complaint which 
initiated this action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT DID IN FACT COMPLY WITH THE 
NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION B OF THE 
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT BY 
SERVING A LETTER ON EACH RESPONDENT 
MORE THAN NINETY DAYS PRIOR TO THE IN-
ITIATION OF THIS ACTION. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was originally 
-3-
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enacted in 1976 and is found at 78-14-1 et seq., Utah Code 
Ann. This Act was amended in several aspects by the Utah 
Legislature in 1979. Although appellant's cause of action 
accrued prior to the enactment of these amendments, it is clear 
that her cause of action is to be goverened by the Act in its 
amended form, since these amendments dealt only with procedural 
matters. Foil v. Ballinger, No. 16071, filed September 19, 1979. 
Section 8 of the Act now reads as follows: 
"No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be initiated unless and until the 
plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or 
his executor or successor, at least ninety days 
prior notice of intent to commence an action. 
Such notice shall include a general statement 
of the nature of the claim, the persons involved, 
~he date, time and place of occurence, the cir-
cumstances thereof, specific allegations of mis-
conduct on the part of the prospective defendant, 
the nature of the alleged injuries and other 
damages sustained. Notice may be in letter or 
affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his 
attorney ... " 
Since the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is of 
recent vintage, there is very little case law in existence to 
aid in the interpretation of its notice requirement. In fact, 
no case has been found in which this Court has addressed the 
question of what constitutes sufficient compliance with the 
requirements of 78-14-8. For this reason, it is helpful to 
look to analogous situations in which notices of claim are 
required to be filed prior to the initation of an action. 
One such situation is found in Hatch v. Weber County, 
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459 P.2d 436 (Utah 1969). In that case, plaintiff had served 
a notice of claim for attorneys' fees on the county in the form 
of a letter to the County Commission, County Clerk, and County 
Attorney and defendant contended that no proper claim had been 
filed pursuant to 17-15-10, Utah Code Ann. This Court rejected 
the contention that strict compliance with 17-15-10 was necessary 
and stated that it was sufficient if the statute was substantially 
complied with when such substantial compliance fulfilled the 
purposes for which the notice requirement was designed. 
Similarly, with regard to various other statutes that 
provide for the giving of notice, this Court has also embraced 
the doctrine of substantial compliance. Thus, in State v. 
District Court of Salt Lake County, 115 P.2d 913 (Utah 1941), 
which case involved an action against the State of Utah for the 
disgorgement of an unlawful tax, it was stated that "There must 
be substantial compliance with the designated statutory pro-
cedure." Further, in Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Morse, 
136 P. 965 (Utah 1913), Mr. Justice Frick adopted the doctrine 
of substantial compliance citing 29 Cyc. 1117: 
"The general rule in respect to notices is 
that mere informalities do not vitiate them 
so long as they do not mislead, and give the 
necessary information to the proper parties." 
That strict compliance is not essential to satisfy the 
notice requirement of 78-14-8 is further shown by analyzing 
those situations in which strict compliance with statutory 
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procedure has been typically required by the Utah courts. Those 
cases requiring a strict and literal compliance with the statute~ 
procedure have generally involved a statutorily created right, 
such as the right to sue a governmental entity. For example, 
see Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 
(Utah 1975) . The rationale of requiring strict compliance in 
such a situation is that a party who is seeking the benefit of 
a statutorily derived right should not be allowed to claim only 
the favorable aspects of the statute which confers the right 
and to ignore the conditions upon which that right is predicated. 
It should be noted, however, that ample authority exists for the 
proposition that substantial compliance will suffice even where 
the notice of claim requirement arises from a statutorily 
created right. Nelson v. Dunkin, 419 P.2d 984 (Wash. 1966); 
Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, 456 P.2d 766 (Idaho 1969). 
Regardless of the split of authority as to whether 
strict compliance is required when attempting to enforce a 
statutorily created right, it is clear that the instant case 
is not of the type of cases in which the Utah courts have 
required strict compliance with the procedural requirements. 
That is, the right to sue for malpractice does not arise as 
the result of a statutory enactment waiving immunity subject 
to stated conditions, but rather, it is a long standing common 
law right. Further, it is a well settled principle that the 
Utah statutes are to be liberally construed to effect their 
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objectives and to promote justice. 68-3-2, Utah Code Anno. 
Such a policy of liberality requires that a plaintiff need 
only manifest substantial compliance with the notice requirement 
of 78-14-8. 
An examination of the notice of intent provided in 
the instant case shows that appellant did substantially comply 
with 78-14-8. This notice was in letter form, dated April 7, 
1978, and executed by appellant's attorney. Said notice was 
timely served within the statute of limitations provided for by 
78-14-4 on respondents Vernal Family Health Center, Dr. Lee 
Balka, Vernal Drug company, and Uintah County Hospital on 
April 12, 1978. Appellant's complaint was not filed until 
July 19, 1978--a period of ninety-eight days subsequent to the 
service of the notice of intent on each defendant. 
The notice served on respondents contained the follow-
ing language: 
Pursuant to 78-14-8, UCA, notice is herewith 
given that Marzine Yates, husband of Velma Gladys 
Yates, potentially is asserting and claiming and 
~ornrnence a civil action for damages arising 
out of possible negligent prescribing, negligent 
dispensing of drugs or other forms of prescribed 
medicine, and negligent hospitalization and 
treatment of his wife. In compliance with the 
aforesaid section of the Utah Code, it is believed 
and will be alleged in the event a civil action is 
commenced that from approximately March 1976 until 
March 1978, plaintiff's wife received prescriptions 
from the Vernal Drug Company believed to have been 
prescribed by Dr. Lee Balka in his official capa-
city as a partner or responsibl~ agent of.th~ 
Vernal Family Health Center, which prescriptions, 
in combination of use or separate, were dispensed 
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in an excessive amount which has resulted in 
permanent mental damage to claimant's wife. 
It is further believed that as a result of 
the prolonged excess abuse of the precription 
medication, the seizure and subsequent coma 
which claimant's wife suffered approximately 
one year ago were possibly the result of negli-
ence. (emphasis added) 
Section 8 of the Health Care Malpractice Act states 
that the following information be contained in the notice of 
intent: 
1) a general statement of the nature of the claim, 
2) the persons involved, 
3) the date, time and place of occurence, 
4) the circumstances thereof, 
5) specific allegations of misconduct, and 
6) the nature of the alleged injuries. 
A reading of the letter served by appellant indicates that 
appellant did provide respondents with the above information and 
substantially complied with 78-14-8 in all aspects. That is, 
the claim was identified as one involving negligent prescribing 
and dispensing of drugs and negligent hospitalization, the 
appellant and respondents were identified, the time of occurence 
was set during the period from March 1976 to March 1978 and 
specific misconduct was alleged in the excessive supplying of 
appellant with prescriptions resulting in seizures and injuries 
consisting of permanent mental damage. This information suffi-
ciently apprised respondents of appellant's claim and substan-
-8-
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tially complied with the provisions of 78-14-8. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF 
APPELLANT'S INTENT TO COMMENCE A MAL-
PRACTICE ACTION SUFFICIENT TO FULLY 
SATISFY THE PURPOSES COMTEMPLATED BY 
THE LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING SECTION 8 
OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT. 
Not only did appellant comply with the provisions of 
78-14-8, but her notice further satisfied the intend underlying 
the enactment of that section. In order to correctly interpret 
the notice requirement of 78-14-8, the legislative intent 
underlying the Health Care Malpractice Act must be ascertained, 
since these provisions must be construed so as to accomplish 
the purposes of the Act. Section 2 of this Act states the 
purposes of the Act as follows: 
... to provide a reasonable time in which actions 
may be commenced against health care providers 
while limiting that time to a specific period 
for which professional liability insurance pre-
miums can be reasonably and accurately calcu-
lated; and to provide other procedural changes 
to expedite early evaluation and settlement 
of claims. 
It is apparent that 78-14-8 was adopted merely as a 
procedural device to insure that potential defendants receive 
actual notice of a claim against them, and have an opportunity 
to resolve that claim prior to the filing of a complaint. This 
is conclusively shown by reference to the "Report of the 
Activity and Recommendations of the Social Services Study 
Committee" of December 17, 1975 which is found in Medical 
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Malpractice Insurance Problems, Report to the 4lst Legislative, 
Research Report No. 2, January 1976, Office of Legislative 
Research State of Utah Recommendation 9 of that report established 
the notice requirement now found at 78-14-8 and states: 
The Committee feels that the requirement 
that the plaintiff give notice of action prior 
to suit will enhance the possibility of a 
settlement of the claim before suit. 
Thus, the Legislature intended the notice requirement 
of 78-14-8 to provide potential medical malpractice defendants 
the opportunity to evaluate claims and to engage in settlement 
negotiations prior to the filing of a suit. The intent was not 
to create a technical stumbling block for unwary plaintiffs, 
but only to provide a time period of ninety days within which 
settlement negotiations could be pursued. 
In the instant case, it is not disputed that each 
respondentreceived actual notice of the claim and had ample 
opportunities to investigate the claim and engage in settlement 
proceedings prior to the initiation of litigation. In fact, 
appellant's notice was served with dispatch after the discovery 
in March of 1978 of appellant's mental disabilities, which 
promptness enabled respondents to make an early investigation 
and evaluation of the claim while the matter was of recent 
memory and while witnesses were still readily available. That 
is, appellant has accorded respondents with every right that 
the legislature intended she should. 
-10-
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To adopt a construction of 78-14-8 requiring strict 
and technical compliance, in the fact of actual knowledge by 
respondents of the type of information designed to be provided 
by 78-14-8, would be an obvious injustice. Further, such a 
reading would thrwart the purpose of the Act by erecting a 
mere technical requirement serving to increase uncertainity, 
which is inimical to the facilitation of reasonable and 
accurate calculation of premiums. Form should not be held 
in violate at the cost of substance, especially where respondents 
had actual notice of the claim, which actual notice provided 
respondents with the information and settlement period which 
78-14-8 was intended to provide. 
POINT III 
IN ADDITION TO COMPLIANCE WITH 78-14-8, 
APPELLANT SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
ALL OTHER APPLICABLE STATUTE'S PROVIDING 
FOR THE FILING OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the 
only other such applicable statute providing for the filing of 
a notice of claim is found in the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann., at Section 11. On its 
fact, 17-15-10, Utah Code Ann., which requires the filing of 
claims against the county with the County Auditor, appears to 
be applicable. A closer examination, however, reveals that 
such a contention cannot stand. 
17-15-10 was first enacted in the Revised Statutes, 
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1898, while the Utah Governmental Irrununity Act was enacted in 
1965. Prior to this statutory abrogration of irrununity for 
actions sounding in negligence by governmental entities in 
1965, a cause of action founded in this abrogation of irrununity 
is to be governed solely by the procedure enunicated in the 
statute which waives the irrununity. Such a conclusion is con-
sistent with the role that when two statutes relate to the same 
general statute to govern those situations within the scope of 
its coverage. Rarrunell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977). 
The requirement of a filing of a notice pursuant to 
the Utah Governmental Irrununity Act is found at 63-30-11 as 
follows: 
Any person having a claim for injury to 
person or property against a governmental 
entity or its employee shall, before main-
taining an action under this act, file a 
written notice of claim with such entity 
for appropriate relief including money 
damages. The notice of claim shall set 
forth a brief statement of the facts and 
the nature of the claim asserted, shall be 
signed by the person making the claim or 
such person's agent, attorney, parent or 
legal guardian, and shall be directed and 
delivered to the responsible governmental 
entity within the time prescribed in Sec-
tion 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as applicable. 
An examination of the notice served on respondents on April 12, 
1978, (see text of this notice on page 7) shows compliance with 
the above quoted section. That is, said notice was in writing, 
was served prior to the filing of this action, contained a 
brief statement of the facts and the nature of the claim, 
-12-
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was signed by appellant's attorney and husband, and, as will 
be discussed below, was timely filed. Further, the notice 
furnished by appellant fully satisfied the purposes for which 
the notice of claim statue was enacted. These purposes were 
identified by Mr. Justice Maughn in his dissenting opinion in 
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (1975): 
The purpose of statutes requiring the presenta-
tion of claims to political subdivisions, prior 
to filing a suit, is in furtherance of public 
policy to present unnecessary litigation. The 
purpose of notice provisions is to afford the 
political subdivision an opportunity to investi-
gate the claim while the matter is of recent 
memory, witnesses are yet available, conditions 
have not materially changed and to determine if 
there is liability, and if there is, the extent 
of it. 
Mr. Justice Maughn also rejected the contention that strict 
compliance with the notice of claim statute was required when 
defendant was provided with all of the opportunities that the 
statute was intended to provide. 
With regard to the question whether appellant's 
notice of claim was timely filed, Section 63-30-13 provides 
that claims against a political subdivision are barred unless 
filed within one year after the cause of action arises. Thus, 
it is crucial to make the determination as to when appellant's 
cause of action arose. This Court recently held in Foil v. 
Ballinger, No. 16071, filed September 19, 1979, that in a 
medical malpractice action, the statute of limitations does 
not begin to run "until the injured person knew or should have 
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known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was 
caused by negligent action." Similarly, in the context of a 
notice of claim filed against a county pursuant to 63-30-13, 
Utah Code Ann., this Court held that no cause of action arose 
·until plaintiff actually discovered the cause of the damage to 
his property. Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (1978). 
Both of these decisions relied on Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 
435 (Utah 1968), wherein this Court stated: 
It seems somewhat incongruous that an injured 
person must commence a malpractice action prior 
to the time he knew, or reasonably should have 
known, of his injury and right of action. 
Thus, appellant's cause of action could not have 
arisen until appellant had discovered the injury and that such 
injury was caused by negligent conduct. The earliest possible 
date that this discovery could have occurred would have been 
on April 12, 1977, the date of appellant's release from Uintah 
County Hospital. It is much more likely, however, that the 
cause of action did not arise until March of 1978, after 
appellant's condition had stabilized and examination revealed 
permanant mental disability. In any event, since the notice 
of claim was served on April 12, 1978, such complaint was 
timely--that is, the earliest date on which the one year period 
provided by 63-30-13 could have run was April 13, 1978. 
Regardless of whether appellant's claim was filed 
within one year of the accrual of her cause of action, appellant', 
mental disability tolled the running of the one year filing 
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period. Section 78-12-36 states: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other-
than for the recovery of a real property, is at 
the time the cause of action accrued, either: 
(1) Under the age of majority; or, 
(2) Mentally incompetent and without a 
legal guardian, or, 
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge ... 
The time such disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the action. 
This provision was before the court in the context of the notice 
provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in Scott v. 
School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 746 (1977) 
In that case, Mr. Justice Hall stated: 
Notwithstanding the prior pronouncements of 
this court, a minor claimant is justly entitled 
to the protection afforded by said Section 
78-12-36(1), UCA, 1953, in all cases, including 
notice requirements of the type contained in the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. To hold other-
wise is a denial of due process and equal pro-
tection. 
Additionally, Section 63-30-11 provides that if the claimant 
is a minor or mentally incompetent, or imprisoned at the time 
that the cause of action accrued, then the court may extend 
the time for service of the notice of claim. 
Thus, even though it appears that appellant's notice 
was filed within one year of the accrual of her cause of action, 
had it not been so timely filed, the tolling provisions of 
78-12-36, Utah Code Ann. and 63-30-11, Utah Code Ann., would 
have prevented the running of the one year notice period due to 
appellant's mental disability. 
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POINT IV 
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED BY SECTION 
63-30-11, UTAH CODE ANN. IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AS A RESULT OF ITS DENIAL OF 
EQUAL PROTECTION. 
The notice provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act have the effect of dividing all tort-feasors into 
classes of tort-feasons: 
1) private tort-feasors to whom no notice of claim 
is required, and 
2) governmental tort-feasors to whom such notice is 
required. 
The principle of equal protection, guaranteed by both the Utah 
and United States constitutions, does not require equal treat-
ment in law of things factually different, but it does, however, 
require that those similarly situated be similarily treated. 
stated: 
Thus, in State v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920 (1938) this Court 
It is only where some persons or transactions 
excluded from the operation of the law are as 
to the subject matter of the law in no different-
iable class from those included in its operation 
that the law is discriminatory in the sense of 
being arbitrary and unconstitutional. If a 
reasonable basis to differentiate those included 
from those excluded from its operation can be 
found, it must be held constitutional ... 
No such reasonable basis exists in the instant case to justify 
the special procedural treatment afforded governmental tort-
feasors that is not provided to all other tort-feasors. That 
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Legislature intended governmental and private tort-feasors to 
be on equal footing is clearly manifested by a reading of 63-30-4, 
Utah Code Ann. : 
" ... Wherein immunity from suit is waived 
by this act, consent to be sued is granted 
and liability of the entity shall be deter-
mined as if the entity were a private person." 
Since express statutory language negates any possible rational 
basis for the differentiation between private and governmental 
tort-feasors, the requirement of 63-30-11, Utah Code Ann. provid-
ing for the filing of a notice of claim with a governmental tort-
feasor prior to maintaining an action is a denial of equal pro-
tection. Reich v. State Highway Dept., 194 N.W.2d 700 (Mich. 1972); 
Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879 (Nev. 1973). 
POINT V 
THE NOTICE OF INTENT REQUIRED BY 78-14-8, 
UTAH CODE ANN., IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT 
VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26, ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 24 AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Although this Court recently held in McGuire v. University 
of Utah Medical Center, et al., No. 15984, filed November 1, 1979, 
that the 1979 amendments to the Health Care Malpractice Act did 
not constitute special legislation, it has yet to rule as to whe-
ther Section 78-14-8, Utah Code Ann., does constitute special 
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legislation. Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution 
provides that "No private or special law shall be enacted where 
a general law can be applicable." The distinction as to what 
constitutes a special law and what constitutes a general law 
was drawn in State v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414 (Utah 1939), where the 
court defined general laws as: 
"Laws which apply to and operate uniformly upon 
all members of any class of persons, places, or 
things requiring legislation peculiar to them-
selves in the matters covered by the laws in 
question •.. " 
and special laws as: 
" ..• such as relates either to particular persons, 
places, or things, or to persons, places, or things 
which, though not particularized, are separated 
by any method of selection from the whole class 
to which the law might, but for such legislation, 
be applied ..• " 
Thus, a law is a special law if it imposes particular disabili-
ties or conditions upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected 
from the general body of those who stand in the same relation 
to the subject of the law. In this case, 78-14-8 constitutes 
special legislation in that it requires a different and more 
stringent procedure for tort claimants whose injury arises from 
the acts or omissions of a health care provider than is required 1 
of tort claimants who are injured by nonhealth care providers. 
No justification exists for singling out t..~e medical profession 
and providing it with procedural protection not afforded other 
groups. Certainly other professional groups have as great a 
need for procedural safeguards as does the medical profession. 
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On the other hand, should the Court find that the 
statute is a general law, then it violates Article I, Section 
24 of the Utah Constitution. That section states: "All laws 
of a general nature shall have uniform operation." This notice 
provision does not have uniform application to all plaintiffs 
similarily situated and there is no rational basis for this 
desparate treatment of classes. 
Both of the above cited constitutional sections are 
closely related to the question of equal protection. State 
Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 
(Utah 1978). Traditionally, a two-tiered analysis has been 
employed in the area of equal protection. That is, a standard 
of strict scrutiny will be employed when the statute contains 
a suspect class or impinges on a fundamental right. Under 
this standard, the statute will be upheld only if it furthers 
a compelling state interest. All other classification 
schemes have traditionally been tested under the rational 
basis standard which requires the validation of the classi-
fication scheme if there is any conceivable justification 
for its existence. 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has begun 
to adopt an intermediate level of scrutiny which has been 
termed the "means scrutiny standard". Under this standard, 
the inquiry is whether the classification substantially 
furthers the purpose for the classification. In Jones v. State 
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Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that an equal protection challenge to 
medical malpractice legislation is to be measured by the 
means scrutiny test. Thus, the constitutionality of the pro-
visions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act should be 
gauged either by the means scrutiny test of Jones or by the 
higher strict scrutiny standard since the right of access to 
the courts is a fundamental right. Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 11; State ex-rel Schneider v. Liggett, 
576 P.2d 221 (Kan. 1978). 
For the notice provision of 78-14-8 to stand under 
either the strict scrutiny or means scrutiny standards, it 
must be shown that a medical malpractice crisis does in 
fact exist in Utah, that a classification based upon the 
lines of health care providers and non-health care providers 
is not arbitary, and that the legislation does in fact reduce 
the number and amount of medical malpractice awards. Absent 
such a showing, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act must 
be delcared unconstitutional as violative of equal protection. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant complied with the applicable notice of 
claim provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Furthermore, Section 
63-30-11 is unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection 
and Section 78-14-8 is unconstitutional as violative of equal 
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protection and Article VI, Section 26 and Article I, Section 
24 of the Utah Constitution. 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting 
respondents' Motion to Dismiss appellant's complaint. 
1979. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __b__ day of December, 
RO~~ 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Appellant 
72 East Fourth South, #355 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
MAILED OR DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant, this ~day of December, 1979, to the 
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William T. Evans 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Attorney for Vernal Family Health Center 
25 South Wolcott - University of Utah 
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Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn 
Attorneys for Uintah County Hospital 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
John H. Snow 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Attorneys for Vernal Drug Company 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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